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Transformation Is Working. But Are We Measuring the Right Thing?

A decade of stronger B-BBEE scorecard performance shows real compliance gains, but the next test is whether that activity created enduring economic capability and genuine participation.

Published 2026-08-11

David Micah Gengan · B-BBEE MDP

South Africa now has, arguably, its most comprehensive ten-year assessment of B-BBEE compliance. What it does not yet have is an equally comprehensive ten-year assessment of B-BBEE impact, and that distinction matters more than it might first appear.

On 29 July 2026, the B-BBEE Commission, together with the dtic, the Competition Commission and the Presidential B-BBEE Advisory Council, released research on South Africa's transformation landscape covering 2013 to 2023. The findings deserve a more careful reading than the binary debate that normally surrounds transformation. Critics will point to weak ownership outcomes, slow management transformation and continued fronting as evidence that B-BBEE has failed. Defenders will point to substantial improvements in Enterprise and Supplier Development, Skills Development and Socio-Economic Development as evidence that it is working. Both positions contain some truth, but neither on its own answers the question South Africa increasingly needs answered: have ten years of improving compliance translated into ten years of measurable economic transformation?

The Commission itself is careful about this distinction. Its research measures performance against the B-BBEE scorecard rather than establishing the causal impact of B-BBEE on GDP growth, employment, inequality, poverty, innovation or enterprise development. That caveat should not weaken the report; it should sharpen the national conversation. After a decade of measuring transformation activity, the next decade must be about proving transformation outcomes.

The compliance gains are real

The Commission's data shows measurable progress across several elements of the B-BBEE framework. Enterprise and Supplier Development performance increased from approximately 19% of available scorecard points in 2013 to 66% in 2023, while Skills Development rose from 17% to 61% over the same period. Socio-Economic Development reached roughly 135% of available target performance by 2023, and ownership performance also improved materially over the decade.

These movements are significant. They show that South African companies have increased expenditure, formalised development programmes, invested in suppliers, funded skills interventions and committed capital to social development at scale. Anyone arguing that transformation has produced no activity or measurable scorecard progress is arguing against the evidence. But activity is not the same as impact, spend is not the same as capability, and a score is not, by itself, proof of economic mobility. That is where the harder governance question begins.

Where transformation remains structurally weak

Progress has not been consistent across the framework, and Management Control remains one of the clearest examples. Performance increased from roughly 44% in 2013 to 54% in 2018, then stalled at about that level through 2023. The Commission itself points to the slow upward mobility of black professionals into executive and board-level positions, and the Generic Sector data reinforces the concern: in 2023, black executive directors represented approximately 18.63% of the total, while black women executive directors represented just 8.39%.

This matters because transformation cannot ultimately be judged only by who appears on a share register. It must also be measured by who exercises authority, who participates economically, who controls capital and who makes decisions. The Commission also identifies a persistent disconnect between ownership, voting rights and actual control, warning that black shareholding does not automatically translate into meaningful participation and influence within businesses. That distinction is central. An ownership structure may satisfy a technical requirement while still failing to create substantive economic agency.

"Some of the weakest outcomes sit in the sectors that matter most"

The sector analysis is equally hard to ignore. In 2023, non-compliance levels were reported at approximately 67% in the Property Sector, 62% in Financial Services and 50% in Agriculture. These are not peripheral industries. They sit at the intersection of land, housing, finance, productive assets and capital formation, so weak transformation here carries consequences that extend well beyond a scorecard and affect economic mobility itself. South Africa must therefore be cautious about equating broad improvements in B-BBEE performance with uniform transformation across the economy. The evidence shows something more complicated: progress exists, but it is uneven.

Beneath the scorecard sits the governance question

Regulatory reporting tells us how organisations perform against the framework in aggregate. It does not always tell us what happens beneath the transaction, programme or intervention, which is where independent due diligence becomes important. Across transformation programmes, a recurring governance problem is the confusion between ownership and stewardship. Transformation funding was never intended to become the property of the parties administering it; it was intended to be stewarded toward a defined economic purpose. Ownership says, “I can do what I want with this.” Stewardship says, “I am accountable for what this becomes.” That distinction is not philosophical, it is operational, and it determines whether development capital becomes productive capability or simply satisfies a compliance obligation.

When transformation activity does not become transformation impact

Several recurring patterns illustrate the problem. Enterprise and Supplier Development assets may be transferred to beneficiaries, only to be sold, diverted or used outside the economic purpose for which they were funded. From a compliance perspective, an intervention occurred. From an economic perspective, supplier capacity may remain unchanged. Grant capital can also remain undeployed for extended periods, with beneficiaries retaining rather than using it for the intended expansion, equipment or operational growth. Higher up the value chain, delays in disbursement can undermine the very businesses these programmes are meant to support. Whatever the cause, the governance issue is the same: was the capital deployed for its intended economic purpose, and can that outcome be evidenced? If the answer is unclear, reporting expenditure alone is insufficient.

The intermediary question must also be confronted

South Africa's ESD ecosystem relies heavily on intermediaries, business development service providers, incubators and programme managers. Many provide legitimate and valuable support, but the market is uneven. The 2024 GIBS white paper on ESD ecosystem effectiveness estimates the value of ESD programmes at approximately R20 billion to R30 billion per annum. Citing B-BBEE Commission research, it also notes that only 62% of reporting entities had effective ESD strategies and only 61% of programme targets had been achieved. GIBS further records concerns about the quality, professionalism and accountability of some business development service providers operating within the ecosystem, and one industry respondent interviewed for the research estimated that only 30% of organisations operating in the space could be regarded as credible.

That figure should not be read as an independent audit of the entire intermediary market, but the underlying concern should not be dismissed either. When billions of rand are deployed annually through third parties, governance over those third parties cannot remain optional. Due diligence should not begin after money has moved; it should determine whether money should move in the first place.

Fronting remains a live governance failure

The industry also needs to resist the temptation to speak about fronting as though it belongs to an earlier phase of B-BBEE. It does not. During the 2026 national dialogue on the future of B-BBEE, fronting was again characterised as a serious economic threat, with government calling for stronger enforcement. B-BBEE Commissioner Tshediso Matona was reported as stating that 60 fronting matters had been referred for prosecution but remained unresolved.

Fronting can take many forms: nominal ownership, artificial management structures, simulated beneficiary arrangements, or transactions that create the appearance of empowerment without corresponding economic participation or control. The governance risk is obvious. Every fraudulent or simulated structure does more than distort a scorecard. It undermines the credibility of legitimate transformation, and it exploits the very people the policy exists to empower.

The Transformation Fund debate makes the governance question even more important

In January 2026, the dtic published proposed amendments to the B-BBEE Codes that included a Transformation Fund route. Under the proposal, companies could contribute 3% of net profit after tax to the Fund and potentially earn up to 20 weighting points as an alternative Enterprise and Supplier Development mechanism. The objective of creating larger pools of development capital is understandable, but scale cannot replace accountability.

Empowerdex has questioned whether the proposed Fund could lawfully and practically be constituted in its envisaged form without the necessary parliamentary, National Treasury and public-finance processes. It has also raised concerns around transparency, contributor visibility and the ability to demonstrate how funds ultimately translate into measurable beneficiary outcomes. These questions should not be dismissed as administrative obstacles. They are governance questions. If transformation capital is pooled nationally, independent oversight becomes more important, not less, and the larger the pool of capital, the greater the need for traceability, fiduciary discipline, beneficiary verification and outcome measurement. South Africa should not build a national mechanism that measures contribution more effectively than it measures consequence.

The illusion of impact

This is where the next phase of the transformation debate must begin. The Commission's ten-year evidence shows that South Africa has become better at measuring transformation compliance. What remains significantly harder to prove is whether equivalent progress occurred in enterprise sustainability, employment creation, supplier graduation, productive capacity and genuine economic participation. This is not an argument against B-BBEE. It is an argument for better B-BBEE, the difference between asking how much was spent and asking what changed because it was spent, between asking whether the programme was implemented and whether the beneficiary became more economically capable, between asking whether the company earned the points and whether South Africa gained productive capacity. That is the risk of the illusion of impact: a system can become very good at measuring activity while still struggling to measure consequence.

The next decade must be governed differently

The honest conclusion from the Commission's research is not that transformation has failed, nor that it has succeeded. The evidence supports a more disciplined conclusion: South Africa has demonstrated that it can improve transformation compliance, and the next governance challenge is proving that compliance converted into transformation.

That requires a shift in how the ecosystem thinks, from expenditure to outcomes, from declarations to evidence, from programme completion to capability creation, from ownership to stewardship, from compliance assurance to governance assurance. Because where stewardship fails, governance breaks. Where governance breaks, transformation becomes theatre. And theatre cannot build an economy.

The next decade of transformation should therefore not be judged by how much money moved through the system. It should be judged by what remained after the money moved: the businesses that survived, the suppliers that graduated, the jobs that endured, the skills that became productive, the beneficiaries who gained genuine economic agency, and the institutions able to demonstrate, independently and with evidence, that their transformation was not merely reported. It was real.